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ABSTRACT The article compares two social prescribing interventions in Northern England. One was
ﬁnanced through a Social Impact Bond (SIB) and the other was ﬁnanced in a more conventional way. It
utilises a comparative approach to understand the extent to which different methods of ﬁnancing social
prescribing conform to key features of the New Public Management (NPM) or New Public Governance
(NPG) in their design and implementation. It ﬁnds that a SIB approach tends towards NPM during
programme design and implementation and that this creates challenges for social prescribing pro-
grammes, the complexity of which appear better suited to an NPG-based relational approach.
Keywords: social impact bonds; social prescribing; New Public Management; comparative
governance; qualitative methods
1. Introduction
Promoting the health and social wellbeing of populations living in economically disadvan-
taged post-industrial urban areas presents signiﬁcant challenges for policymakers inWestern
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countries. In this article, we compare the design and implementation phases of an interven-
tion that seeks to improve the social wellbeing and health outcomes for service users within
such populations in two distinct areas of Northern England. Whilst the intervention – social
prescribing – is the same in both sites – the ﬁnancing mechanism is different. In one site, a
Social Impact Bond (SIB) based on payment by results (PBR) is used. In the other site the
intervention is ﬁnancedmore conventionally – through the allocation of purely public money
and without a PBR component.
The comparative approach enables us to explore the following research questions:
(a) How does the design and implementation of a social prescribing intervention
ﬁnanced through a SIB compare to one that is ﬁnanced through conventional
commissioning processes?
(b) To what extent can any contrasting features be explained by each intervention’s
adherence to a particular public management regime (i.e. NPM or NPG,) and what
are the implications of these for the future design and implementation of social
prescribing interventions, and SIBs more generally?
These are important empirical questions with implications for understanding how the
health and wellbeing of marginalised urban communities can be supported that also address
an identiﬁed gap in knowledge regarding the challenges and enabling factors associated with
the set-up and implementation of a SIB vis-à-vis conventional funding models. Although
there are further important comparative questions about how different funding models affect
programme outcomes, including whether SIBs generate better outcomes than conventional
approaches, the quantitative data that would enable such a comparison are not yet available.
Moreover, before quantitative outcome data can be used comparably it is ﬁrst important to
understand and critically reﬂect on the purposes for which these data are collected and the
implications of this for programme implementation.
Our research questions also enable us to engage with an important theoretical debate
about whether SIBs represent an extension or a diminution of the New Public
Management (NPM) (Warner 2013; Fraser et al. 2018a; Le Pendeven 2019). We apply
a comparative analytical framework to understand the extent to which the different
approaches to ﬁnancing social prescribing conform to key features of the NPM archetype
or whether they are more closely aligned with the post-NPM archetype referred to as
New Public Governance (NPG) (Osborne 2006, 2010). This approach enables us to
ground our analysis in broader debates about the tenets of effective public management.
The SIB model has been developed over the past decade to aid the design and
upfront ﬁnancing of public services. SIBs purport to promote “outcomes” for service
users as opposed to “outputs” by ﬁnancing interventions in a way that directly
connects ﬁnancial reward for service providers and their investors to the achievement
performance targets. SIB proponents claim that this shifts the ﬁnancial risk of inter-
vention failure from government to private investors; it enables smaller non-proﬁt
providers to access service contracts; and delivers social improvements whilst gen-
erating cashable savings for the public purse (Mulgan et al. 2011). Nonetheless, others
emphasise caution regarding the SIB model, highlighting the lack of evidence about
whether or not the supposed beneﬁts of SIBs are realised in practice (Warner 2013;
Cooper et al. 2016; Neyland 2018).
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SIBs usually involve four different parties. Firstly, commissioners – central or local
government bodies responsible for the provision of relevant public services. Secondly,
service providers – who are often drawn from the non-proﬁt sector and deliver the
services to speciﬁed populations. Thirdly, external investors – who cover the upfront
costs of service provision, in exchange for a commitment by commissioners to re-pay
their initial investment plus a return if pre-deﬁned target outcomes are achieved. In the
UK, charitable foundations ﬁnanced many of the early SIBS (Fraser et al. 2018b), but
SIBs are increasingly being ﬁnanced through “social investment funds”, such as the
Bridges Social Impact Bond Fund seeded by Big Society Capital. The ﬁnal party may be
referred to as intermediaries – including investment managers, who are often involved in
developing projects, securing contracts, facilitating investment and managing project
delivery. It is the addition of these ﬁnal two parties that sets SIBs apart from traditional
PBR approaches, which are based around the commissioner‒provider relationship.
SIB-ﬁnanced interventions typically target costly, complex and intractable social problems.
One such intervention is social prescribing, which aims to improve health and wellbeing for
people with complex health conditions by enabling healthcare practitioners to refer patients to
social support and activities provided by non-proﬁt organisations in their local area (Kimberlee
2015; Dayson 2017). In practice a social prescription involves three steps: (1) a referral to a link
worker (usually hosted by a local non-proﬁt organisation) by a healthcare practitioner; (2) a
conversation between the link worker and patient to identify their physical, social and emo-
tional support needs, and social interests; (3) brokerage of a tailored programme of supported
social and community activity provided by local non-proﬁt organisations.
This article proceeds by discussing our theoretical framing, situating public service
commissioning and SIBs within debates associated with public policy, management and
governance. We then outline a comparative analytical framework and methodology
before presenting our ﬁndings, comparing and contrasting some central components of
the two social prescribing interventions and how they may conform to a particular
governance archetype. Finally, we discuss the implications of our ﬁndings.
2. Theoretical Framing
Since the 1980s, the tenets of NPM asserting the superiority of private sector manage-
ment techniques have permeated public services throughout the Western world. (Hood
1991; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Although NPM is often applied in loose terms,
Dunleavy et al. (2006) frame it as being based on three main principles: the disaggrega-
tion of public sector goals into measureable objectives for which particular actors can be
held responsible; the introduction of competition between providers through outsourcing
and contracting; and incentivisation, through the concentration of practices such as PBR.
Despite the widespread adoption of these principles NPM has been criticised on a
number of grounds, notably for its adherence to techniques imported from the private
sector despite signiﬁcant evidence about their inapplicability to the plural and networked
nature of public services (McLaughlin et al. 2002; Salamon 2002).
More recently, a number of post-NPM models have been advocated by public policy
and management scholars to highlight the impact of technological and relational devel-
opments upon public policy and service delivery (Dunleavy et al. 2006; Osborne 2006,
2010; Stoker 2006). In this article, we engage with key facets of the NPG model which
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re-orients the focus from management toward the relational aspects of governance to
more accurately reﬂect the day-to-day realities within public services (Osborne 2006,
2010). The core premise of NPG is that a range of public and non-public organisations
contribute to public sector goals, and that the relationships between these organisations
can be formally governed through service contracts and administrative transactions
(Salamon 2002) or be enacted in less formal spaces such as networks where institutional
and personal (inter-)relationships have a central role (Rhodes 1997).
Service “commissioning” is a term used in the UK to describe a core function of
public service organisations. It refers to “a cycle of assessing the needs of people in an
area, designing and then securing an appropriate service” (Cabinet Ofﬁce 2006) and is a
key process by which public sector bodies manage their relationships with non-state
providers (Rees and Mullins 2016; Milbourne and Murray 2017). Because of its associa-
tion with outsourcing, competitive tendering and the separation of purchasers and
providers (Bovaird et al. 2012) it has been argued that commissioning is an embodiment
of the NPM (Salamon and Toepler 2015). However, others have highlighted the rela-
tional and trust-based nature of commissioning (Rees 2013) and its situation within wider
models of networked governance (Rhodes 1997) and partnership (Carmel and Harlock
2008), which align more closely with NPG.
In practice, public service commissioning occurs on a continuum, with a classic NPM
archetype at one extreme and a “softer” NPG archetype at the other, with various hybrid
models in between, and much resting on the extent to which individual commissioners
adhere to codiﬁed frameworks or apply individual discretion (Milbourne 2013). The SIB
model, with its extension of PBR and introduction of external investors and intermediary
actors, alongside closely monitored outcome payment targets, represents an evolution from
previous commissioning approaches. It is not surprising therefore that the SIB model of
commissioning, including its theoretical underpinnings, has provoked considerable debate
amongst public policy, management and governance scholars (Fraser et al. 2018b).
Warner (2013) has argued that SIBs may represent an extension of several NPM
logics, in particular its reliance on contracting mechanisms. In SIB-ﬁnanced projects
signiﬁcant control over service delivery is ceded to intermediary organisations alongside
an increased emphasis on performance management (Warner 2013; Cooper et al. 2016).
However, there is contention concerning the extent to which SIBs conform to Dunleavy
et al.’s (2006) principles of NPM (Le Pendeven 2019) and Fox and Albertson (2011,
2012) highlight SIBs’ potential to lessen some of the harsher edges of NPM as they shift
the focus from process to outcomes measurement. Whilst this view is contested, it has
been argued that such a shift might be seen as providing service delivery staff with
greater discretion to ﬂexibly meet client needs and better aligning the goals of all
stakeholders, prompting Joy and Shields (2013) to suggest that SIBs may more closely
resemble Osborne’s NPG model. SIBs, viewed through an NPG lens, may be interpreted
as a variant of a public‒private partnership, in that they promote long-term collaboration
between public, private and non-proﬁt actors, for example through longer contracts and
contractual alliances (Teicher et al. 2006), and include anti-market elements such as the
suspension of competitive procurement processes (Neyland 2018).
This collaborative rationale is prevalent in some of the most recent narratives relating to
SIBs in the UK which position them as representing a shift to “neo-corporatist values”
(Osborne 2006) in the commissioning of public services – suggesting that SIBs encourage
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collective co-design of complex care pathways and sustained inter-organisational commit-
ments rather than short-term competitive contracting (Fraser et al. 2018b). Thus, by promot-
ing upfront collaboration between key actors SIBs may challenge the competitive logic
which has become prevalent in the commissioning of public services as well as challenging
traditional responses to policy problems by establishing of new coalitions and networks of
actors. Thus, the contested, ambiguous (Fraser et al. 2018a) nature of SIB approaches to
commissioning public services provides fertile ground for research building on existing
comparative scholarship on the impacts of managerial reforms on NHS health policy (Bevan
2010). In the following section we outline an analytical framework to explore the research
questions highlighted in the introduction.
3. Analytical Framework
This article takes as its theoretical start point Osborne’s (2006, 2010) framing of the
NPM and NPG as governance archetypes. In particular, we compare the extent to
which the two social prescribing interventions adhere to particular archetypes.
Analytically we centre on three elements of Osborne’s model ‒ (1) focus and
emphasis, (2) relationship to non-public partners and the allocation of resources,
and (3) governance and accountability mechanisms – as these are most relevant to
public service commissioning. An overview of this framework is provided in Figure 1
and explained in more detail below.
1. What is the focus and emphasis of the model?
This relates to the focus and emphasis of key actors within the public service
system. Under NPM this is intra-organisational management: managing organisational
resources and performance through the monitoring of inputs and outputs (i.e. efﬁ-
ciency) at the service level. Under the NPG archetype this is inter-organisational
governance: negotiating values, meaning and relationships between multiple actors
and stakeholder groupings in order to understand service processes and outcomes (i.e.
effectiveness).
2. What is the relationship between the state and external stakeholders and how are
resources allocated?
This relates to the role of external actors – from the private and non-proﬁt sectors –
and their relationship with public sector bodies, which is inexorably linked to resource
allocation. Under NPM, external organisations are viewed as independent contractors
with limited input into wider service or developmental processes. As such, resources are
allocated through competitive (quasi-)market processes. Under NPG, external organisa-
tions are more engaged in service development through “preferred supplier” status and
recognition of the interdependence between multiple actors within a service system. This
allows for resources to be allocated based on an understanding of the networked nature of
service systems, including the suspension of competitive tendering.
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3. What are the governance and accountability mechanisms?
This focusses on the governance and accountability mechanisms and processes asso-
ciated with delivery. Under NPM, services are governed through contracts, with providers
held accountable for meeting performance targets. Under NPG, although services are still
governed through contracts, these are more trust-based and relational and do not directly
connect payment with predetermined targets, or hold providers to account over these.
4. Methods
This article uses a case study approach (Yin 2003) to compare two distinct social
prescribing interventions in post-industrial urban settings in northern England. The
comparative approach aids increased understanding around both the intervention
(social prescribing) and the ﬁnancing mechanism (SIB) within the context of health
policy making (Dodds 2018). It draws on pooled data from three separately funded
programmes of long-term research by three separate research teams. One research
team has been evaluating the implementation and effectiveness of a conventionally
ﬁnanced social prescribing intervention since 2013. The second research team has
been evaluating the implementation of the SIB-ﬁnanced social prescribing interven-
tion since 2014. Both evaluations were commissioned by local healthcare commis-
sioners and their service providers.
Figure 1. A framework for comparing SIB and non-SIB approaches to commissioning social
prescribing
Regime What is the focus and emphasis 
of the model?
What is relationship 
between the state and 
external orgs and how are 
resources allocated?
What are the 
governance and 
accountability 
mechanisms?
New Public 
Management
Intra-organisational management: 
managing organisational resources 
and performance through the 
monitoring service inputs and 
outputs
External organisations are 
independent contractors 
within a marketplace
The market and 
performance based 
contracts
New Public 
Governance
Inter-organisational governance: 
negotiating values, meaning and 
relationships  in order to 
understanding service processes 
and outcomes
External organisations are 
preferred suppliers and 
interdependent actors
Trust, networks and 
relational contracts
Source: Adapted from Osborne (2006, 2010).
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The third research team was commissioned by central government to conduct a three-
year evaluation (2014–2017) of the ﬁrst SIB-ﬁnanced projects in the UK to tackle health
and social care issues. One of these projects was the SIB-ﬁnanced social prescribing
intervention discussed in this article. The evaluation included a comparative component,
with each SIB project compared qualitatively with a project elsewhere in the country that
had the same or similar interventions and target populations provided by a similar type of
organisation but ﬁnanced in more conventional terms. The other site was identiﬁed as
part of this comparative case study approach due to intervention and demographic
similarities and included in the study design as a comparative case study.
To ensure coherence and prevent duplication between the three studies the third research
team liaised closely with the research teams in each site: they met and approved interview
schedules, discussed relevant interviewees, and have engaged in regular meetings and data
analysis workshops since 2014. In 2017 the three research teams agreed to collaborate on a
more extensive comparative project by pooling data and undertaking additional joint analysis
of key themes. Details on informant interviews are given in Figure 2.
A total of 98 interviews were conducted across the three studies and two sites
between 2014 and 2017 and relevant documents were collected and analysed. We
purposively sampled informants to include public health service commissioners, non-
proﬁt providers, investment managers and investors. Most interviews were undertaken
face-to-face, though a number of interviews were also carried out by telephone.
Whilst interview schedules used across all interviews were not identical, there is a
good degree of convergence thanks to cross-team collaboration. Interview transcripts
were coded using Nvivo 10 software. Initial codes were based on themes arising
directly from the interview questions. Two members from each research team ana-
lysed interview data collaboratively to ensure inter-coder reliability, closely engaging
with the data and wider theoretical insights both inductively and deductively (Langley
1999) and engaging iteratively with NPM and NPG archetypes.
Figure 2. Overview of data collected across three studies
Research Team Conventionally financed social 
prescribing intervention
SIB-financed social prescribing 
intervention
Total
Research Team 1 2014 - 17: 39 interviews N/A 39
Research Team 2 N/A
2015: 13 interviews
2016: 12 interviews
25
Research Team 3 2015: 15 interviews 2014: 5 interviews
2017: 14 interviews
34
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5. Findings
The following sections present the main ﬁndings of the study. We begin with an over-
view of the two interventions, their local development and comment on points of
contextual signiﬁcance before presenting the comparative analysis of the commissioning
and implementation process in both sites.
5.1. An Overview of the Two Social Prescribing Services
The SIB-ﬁnanced social prescribing intervention is situated in a medium-sized city –
“Beardstown” – in Northern England. Like many urban areas in Northern England it
remains characterised by high levels of health inequality as a legacy of earlier post-
industrial economic decline. Although social prescribing-like activity had been undertaken
here for the preceding 20 years, in 2011 work began to develop a large-scale social
prescribing intervention ﬁnanced through a SIB. This development work initially involved
local health commissioners, the local non-proﬁt umbrella body and a number of front-line
non-proﬁts with prior involvement in community-led health initiatives. Latterly it involved
a wider range of actors, including SIB intermediaries, investors and grant funders. The
Beardstown project was developed with two strategic aims: (1) to increase the scale and
reach of previous social prescribing activity and (2) to create a culture change in the local
non-proﬁt sector which had previously delivered this activity, making them “more business-
like”, in particular towards a more outcome-based performance management approach. The
SIB ﬁnancing model was ﬁnalised in 2014 and the service went live in 2015.
Participants in the development of the intervention put forward a number of rationales for
ﬁnancing this as a SIB rather than through a conventional approach. These included enabling
social prescribing to achieve a greater scale than it had previously in the area, but in a way that
reduced the ﬁnancial risk for the public commissioner. Informants also noted there was “a
political appetite to test a SIB approach” locally and explore its feasibility for future service
provision. A further rationale for the SIB model was its potential to enable long-term multi-
year collaboration and learning through a long-term contract between the local health service
and the main social prescribing provider.
The conventionally ﬁnanced social prescribing intervention was developed in parallel
with the Beardstown one in a different part of Northern England labelled here as
“Mooretown”. This large town is similarly characterised by high levels of health inequal-
ity and post-industrial decline. In 2011 a consortium of non-proﬁt organisations involved
in healthcare services, led by the local non-proﬁt umbrella body, was tasked by local
health commissioners to develop a new model of working between local non-proﬁts and
the NHS. This included two similar strategic aims to the Beardstown service: (1) to
embed a social prescribing model at scale across the borough and (2) to ensure non-
proﬁts’ involvement in health services was better oriented to achieving priority outcomes
for local health services and patients. Non-recurrent public funding was identiﬁed to
resource a two-year pilot and the service was commissioned in April 2012.
Thus, the main difference between the two social prescribing interventions stemmed
from the decision to ﬁnance one through a SIB and the other through a more conven-
tional commissioning process, drawing solely on public funds.
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5.2. Comparative Analysis of the Social Prescribing Commissioning Process
1. What is the focus and emphasis of the model?
Both services were commissioned to focus on outcomes for people with long-term
health conditions, and both services prioritised the same two outcomes: outcome A,
improvements in the personal wellbeing of social prescribing clients; and outcome B, a
reduction in secondary hospital care use by clients (as a proxy for cost savings). In both
sites, management of the programmes against these outcomes was supplemented by
regular monitoring and reporting of activity data, such as the number and type of
referrals made and the demographic characteristics of service users.
The prima facie emphasis was monitoring outcomes rather than inputs and outputs,
and thus both cases might be viewed as embodying an NPG approach to commissioning.
Despite these similarities there was considerable divergence between the two sites in
terms of how this outcomes framework was implemented in practice, in particular the
purpose for which outcomes data were interpreted and utilised.
In Beardstown, despite an original commitment to use data as a learning tool, the
primary purpose of both outcome A and outcome B was to provide metrics for the
purposes of contract management and PBR, with performance against agreed targets for
both measures triggering payments for investors. This form of contract management via
performance metrics aligns strongly with the NPM archetype: “[T]he data [system] …
was set up… as a communication tool, now it’s used more as a stick rather than a carrot”
(Subcontracted Provider Informant 10 Beardstown). Attempting to use performance data
for both contract management and reﬂective learning led to tensions, as the prime
provider struggled to persuade the subcontracted providers to reﬂect collaboratively on
the implications of outcome data analysis:
I was asked to put all of [the subcontracted providers] side by side and benchmark
them against each other all the time, and I … I still have to do that to a degree with
the data … there was a stage where the providers were really pushing back, really
struggling with … just, kind of … the fact that we weren’t trusting them to get on
with it. (Prime Provider Informant 4 Beardstown)
In particular, subcontracted providers were cautious about the interpretation of their
performance data for potentially punitive contract management purposes.
By contrast, in Mooretown, analysis of outcomes A and B was undertaken by an
independent evaluator (one of the co-authors), and performance against these outcomes
was not tied to contract management.
[T]here’s a lot of data processing that needs doing there and we haven’t got the
capacity to do it, and probably not the knowledge to do that. So it’s easier to hand it
over to somebody else and somebody that’s independent that can try and make sense
of that. (Prime Provider 19 Mooretown)
This independent analysis of outcome data provided the basis for discussion between the
prime provider and commissioners about what the service was achieving and the
implications for future development of the intervention. For example, when analysis of
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outcome B data provided evidence of more positive change for younger service users,
this prompted discussion about whether it would be more appropriate to focus the service
on younger users and how outcomes for older service users could be better understood.
This use of outcome data for learning and understanding across the Mooretown pro-
gramme is closely aligned to NPG approaches.
2. What is the relationship between the state and external stakeholders and how are
resources allocated?
Both interventions represent a form of outsourced public service and both were a
departure from previous approaches to the commissioning of health services. Unusually,
both services also involved two levels of commissioning: ﬁrst, the commissioning of a
prime provider to manage the delivery of the service; and second, the commissioning of
subcontracted providers to deliver social prescribing activities. We consider each stage in
turn below.
In Beardstown, normal tendering processes were suspended to enable a Special
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to be established and become the prime provider of the social
prescribing service. Although a separate organisation, the SPV retained strong links to
the organisations involved in the development of the SIB, a number of which provided
board members to the SPV. Similarly, the commissioning of the intervention in
Mooretown built on the collaborative processes evident during the development stage.
Because the service was initially commissioned as a two-year pilot utilising non-recur-
rent funding that was not committed to existing mainstream services this enabled
commissioners to suspend normal competitive procurement processes and directly com-
mission the local non-proﬁt umbrella body that had led the development process.
In Mooretown, following the two-year pilot, commissioners decided to make social
prescribing a recurrent mainstream service which meant that a contract to deliver the service
had to be let through a competitive tendering process. As the commissioners were satisﬁed
with the existing arrangements for delivering the service, the tender speciﬁcation included a
number of requirements that favoured the existing provider. These included, for example,
experience of delivering social prescribing locally and a track record of working in partner-
ship with local commissioners and non-proﬁts within healthcare.
In Beardstown, the SPV subcontracted service providers to deliver the intervention
through a competitive tender process in which potential service providers were required to
respond to a conventional service speciﬁcation. This was a deliberate strategy on the part of
those who had developed the SIB to (a) support the objective of promoting a culture change
in local non-proﬁts in which these organisations would be more “business-like” and
equipped for the challenges of delivering a SIB and (b) to gain legitimacy in the wider
non-proﬁt sector by providing opportunities to be involved in the new initiative.
By contrast, inMooretown, subcontracted service providers were commissioned to deliver
activities through a small grants programme managed by the prime provider. Local non-
proﬁts were encouraged to develop proposals for activities and services to which clients
could be referred. The grant funding operated on a “test and learn” basis through which
successful proposals were provided with short-term funding (6–12 months) to determine
need and demand for what they are offering, with funding reviewed regularly and activities
revised and developed in response to feedback from clients. The rationale for this model was
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threefold: ﬁrst, it secured buy-in to the idea of social prescribing from the wider non-proﬁt
sector by involving a range of providers in its implementation; second, it built the capacity of
small non-proﬁts to support social prescribing; and, third, it reduced the transaction costs for
commissioners who were not equipped to manage multiple small contracts of this nature.
At a strategic level, in both sites the commissioning of the prime provider was an
inherently relational process through which local commissioners sought to strengthen
their involvement with a limited number of preferred non-proﬁt providers present in
existing networks. Implicitly, this was seen as necessary “reward” for their earlier
contribution to the policy formulation process. It was most evident in the way that
commissioners in both areas suspended normal tendering and procurement processes to
ensure that key players in the development of each service were afforded an implemen-
tation role. In addition, the commissioners themselves, alongside a range of other actors,
engaged in a co-production process to design both interventions.
Thus, in both cases, NPG-style processes of contracting preferred providers, acknowl-
edged as interdependent actors, were followed, as opposed to the competitive tendering
processes that are promoted by NPM. However, the two services diverged somewhat in
their commissioning of social prescribing activities at an operational level. Whilst
Beardstown reverted to a traditional NPM approach involving competitive tendering,
Mooretown extended its NPG-based principles to facilitate the involvement of a broader
range of non-proﬁt providers in the service.
3. What are the governance and accountability mechanisms?
Both sites demonstrated multi-layered, multi-actor governance and accountability
mechanisms. However the complex multi-stakeholder nature of Beardstown marked it
out as considerably more complex, in governance terms, than Mooretown. This was
related to the fact that there were more actors involved in the ﬁnancing and overall
governance of the service at a strategic level. Those ﬁnancing the service included public
funders – both national and local government commissioners; charitable funders; and an
investment manager. The SIB model required that the investment manager received a
return on the original investment based on complex calculations linked to data collected
on outcomes A and B, overseen by the local NHS commissioner but with close scrutiny
of the methodology from the investment manager.
Therefore commissioners and the SPV (which oversaw payments to the subcontracted
non-proﬁt providers and outcome payments to the investment manager) had multiple
contractual and ﬁnancial relationships at a strategic level with a variety of organisations.
These included relationships between the health commissioners and the SPV pertaining
to the performance of outcomes A and B, and between the SPV and the investment
management company that provided upfront money to ﬁnance programme delivery.
Although the contracts covered an extended period, ﬁnance was contingent on the SPV
achieving performance targets, expressed in the form of output- and process-based Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs) – including targets for numbers of people recruited onto
the programme, the speed with which referrals are seen, and the completion of data
capture exercises within particular time windows.
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This second arrangement was crucial to the delivery of the intervention. Failure to
meet targets in respect of the KPIs meant that one payment from the investment manager
to the SPV was withheld – with implications for the parties involved:
[O]nce it was clear that the [subcontracted] providers weren’t, weren’t meeting their
KPIs, [the investment managers] said, well, we need to look at this, and, we’re not
going to provide anymore [ﬁnancial] draw down until we’ve had a good look at this
and decided what this is all about. (Prime Provider Informant 1 Beardstown)
[I]t changed the relationship. There was a period when it, it felt like, you know,
mummy and daddy were withholding our pocket money, and there was that mood in
there, which I think was partly, you know, created some tension in me … I thought
I’m not used to being treated this way. (Prime Provider Informant 3 Beardstown)
A further layer of governance and accountability relationships existed between the SPV
(prime provider) and the non-proﬁt subcontracted providers of the intervention. These
relationships at the operational level focused on monitoring output and process-based
KPIs which mirrored those that the investment managers used to monitor performance of
the SPV. Payment for providers was not (initially) contingent on meeting these targets,
but provision was made for cancelling subcontracts in the event of failure to meet targets
and, unlike the main contract, subcontracts were to be renewed (or not) after two years.
In contrast, in Mooretown, the prime provider received funds for social prescribing
directly from the local NHS commissioner and passed these on as grants to local non-
proﬁt subcontracted providers for services provided with no requirement to calculate
outcomes or payments to external investors. The commissioner and the prime provider
collaboratively monitored progress towards outcomes A and B as well a series of output-
and process-based KPIs.
Similar to Beardstown, these included the number of clients referred and engaged with
but did not include data capture targets. Importantly, and in contrast to Beardstown,
ﬁnancial payment was not tied to performance in any way in Mooretown. Rather, data
was used relationally as part of a learning and development process. Here, the second
layer of governance relationships was between the prime provider and the subcontracted
local non-proﬁt providers in receipt of small grants (17 providers received grants to
deliver 20 services between 2014 and 2016). Given the number of relationships at this
level, and the relatively small size of the grants involved (most are less than £10,000), the
accountability mechanisms were necessarily light touch. Initially, on a monthly basis
providers were required to conﬁrm the start and end date for each service user, document
any reasons for their support ending, and list the nature of any onward referrals made.
Unlike in Beardstown, there was no evidence that the pressure from the KPIs was
passed down to the subcontracted providers. However, as the service evolved, the
accountability requirements did become more onerous, with detailed breakdowns of
the amount of time spent supporting each service user requested. This was in part a
response to a request from the NHS commissioner for more information about the unit
cost of each activity to monitor value for money and to ensure consistency of resource
allocation across the different grants. But it was also born from a view within the lead
provider that grant recipients should be more accountable for the funding they received.
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I’ve got a ﬁnance department here who are saying with all the changes in the charity
regulations we’ve got to go in and audit what we’re giving the grants out for, I’ve
got our auditors saying you’ve got to do that, we’ve agreed with them that we will
spot check, well we’ll pick a couple of organisations a year, we’ve done that and in
every case it’s been problematic cos we’ve had to say if you’re telling us you’re
spending this much you’ve got to give us evidence that you’re spending it on.
(Prime Provider Informant 1 Mooretown)
This additional scrutiny was met with frustration by a number of grant holders, who had
to change their monitoring processes in response, and led to an argument that these
additional non-delivery costs should be met through a proportionate increase in the value
of the grant provided. This frustration was further compounded by the fact the grants
were short term (usually less than 12 months) and did not cover the full costs of delivery.
Thus, the grant funding, whilst welcomed by providers, did not support long-term
planning or sustainability.
Thus, we ﬁnd considerable divergence in the approach taken to governance and
accountability between the two sites. In Beardstown, the contractual relationships at
the strategic level ﬁltered down to the operational level, with stakeholders at each level
holding each other to account for performance against tightly speciﬁed targets. This
performative use of data, and the apparently punitive consequences for failure to meet
targets, suggests that the SIB model of accountability and governance is closely aligned
with the principles of the NPM.
By contrast, in Mooretown, the actors took a more relational approach to account-
ability and governance at the strategic level that is arguably much more closely aligned
with NPG principles. However, this was not replicated at the operational level, where
there was an increasing focus on the relationship between service costs and service
outputs, and ensuring that these costs were not “too high”. Despite services being
provided through grants rather than contracts, this approach was increasingly more
closely aligned with the NPM (Hood 1991; Osborne 2006, 2010), suggesting that even
when strategic-level accountability is primarily relational, contract management practices
can be subject to NPM “creep” in the search for “greater accountability”.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
We now discuss the empirical and theoretical signiﬁcance of our ﬁndings in relation to
our original research questions. Empirically, the comparative qualitative case study
approach of this article illuminated important contextual factors that were key in both
Beardstown and Mooretown to the development, implementation and governance of
social prescribing. These empirical ﬁndings have been interpreted through the theoretical
prism of NPM and NPG archetypes proposed by Osborne (2006, 2010). In his original
development of these ideas, Osborne emphasised their characterisation as Weberian
archetypes through which to analyse and discuss the practical and conceptual develop-
ment and implementation of public services. Indeed, Osborne acknowledges that such
models are inevitably a simpliﬁcation and that elements of the regimes will often coexist
with each other or overlap, with a variety of working practices operating in the shadow of
a dominant hierarchy in which the tenets of one archetype are pre-eminent.
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Our analysis of the commissioning of SIB and conventionally ﬁnanced social pre-
scribing services bears this out. To characterise either the Beardstown or Mooretown
model as NPM or NPG in the purest sense would be to oversimplify what are highly
complex series of processes, relationships and behaviours. Rather, a more appropriate
point to consider is whether or not one regime appears dominant over the other in
different approaches to the ﬁnancing and commissioning of social prescribing, followed
by the implications for the ﬁnancing of similar interventions.
It is clear from our analysis that, during the commissioning phase, both sites were
broadly similar and embodied an NPG-style approach. The initial development of both
interventions was possible due to a number of long-term and embedded trust-based
relationships between key actors in the local public and non-proﬁt sectors and it seems
unlikely that either service would have been developed in their absence. Moreover, in
both sites there were dual strategic objectives of embedding social prescribing at scale
and reorienting the commissioning of non-proﬁts to focus on achieving strategic out-
comes, with outputs and service processes a secondary consideration. However, from this
common start point there was considerable divergence between the two sites, with the
SIB ﬁnancing model a seemingly crucial factor in accounting for this shift.
The implementation of the SIB-ﬁnanced intervention, and the governance and
accountability processes associated with this, were driven by an inherently contract
based approach (Warner 2013; Cooper et al. 2016). In particular, the need to meet
performance targets and a subsequent drive to hold different stakeholders at various
layers to account for achieving them was a deﬁning feature of governance relationships,
leading to an erosion of the trust and relational accountability that had been a feature of
the development phase (Warner 2013; Fraser et al. 2018a). By contrast, in the conven-
tionally ﬁnanced service, although governed by a contractual relationship, the absence of
tightly deﬁned performance targets enabled a number of the trust-based relational
accountability mechanisms to be retained at the strategic level (Osborne 2006, 2010;
Teicher et al. 2006). However, this was less evident at the operational level, where more
stringent reporting requirements were implemented.
Thus, it would seem that neither site ﬁts neatly within an NPM or NPG archetype.
Whilst both services embodied many of the key features of NPG during their develop-
ment, the SIB-ﬁnanced intervention deviated away from this during its implementation,
to the extent that it came to more closely resemble a traditional, arguably even extreme,
NPM regime (Warner 2013; Fraser et al. 2018a) that displayed elements of disaggrega-
tion, competition and incentivisation (Dunleavy et al. 2006; Le Pendeven 2019). By
contrast, during implementation the conventionally ﬁnanced intervention retained many
of the NPG principles that characterised its development.
The experience of these two social prescribing interventions, using two different
ﬁnancing mechanisms, enables us to reﬂect on the suitability of the SIB model for
supporting the design and implementation of social prescribing. Given the complex
and multi-layered nature of the challenges that social prescribing interventions seek to
address – problems which span social and healthcare interventions, and necessarily
involve networks of public and non-proﬁt actors – a relational approach seems a
necessary response. However, our data highlight the tensions created for provider
organisations under the SIB model when the complexity of this work is simpliﬁed into
a NPM-style performance and accountability structure and there is a move away from the
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relationally focussed mechanisms that enable a project to get off the ground in the ﬁrst
place. Although it might be argued that this is a necessary trade-off in support of a shift
to a more outcome-oriented approach by non-proﬁts, the evidence from the convention-
ally ﬁnanced intervention demonstrates that an outcome focus can be achieved whilst
retaining a more relational approach in the longer term.
Overall, and in spite of the claims made by its advocates, we found little evidence of
the SIB mechanism providing relief from the “tyranny of targets”, nor did it necessarily
lead to operational freedom or ﬂexibility for non-proﬁt providers (Mulgan et al. 2011). In
fact, we found quite the reverse, particularly when the SIB approach was compared with
the conventionally ﬁnanced intervention. This echoes previous studies, which found that
the institutional work of establishing a SIB is in tension with, and undermines, the
institutional work required to establish an effective social prescribing intervention
(Fraser et al. 2018a; Lowe et al. 2018). If this is correct, it further suggests that
commissioners who are interested in supporting social prescribing interventions may
preferably seek to maintain the relational and trust-based aspect of their approach to
development throughout the life-cycle of commissioning and delivery by focussing less
on outcomes as performance targets and more on evidence as a tool for learning and
development (Osborne 2006, 2010; Teicher et al. 2006). In practice this is likely to
require an alternative ﬁnancing model to the SIB or, at the very least, supplementing the
PBR aspect of a SIB with a more nuanced and relational approach to outcome measure-
ment and performance management.
Looking beyond our primary foci of social prescribing and SIBs, our analysis also
contributes to wider theoretical debates within the study of public policy, management
and governance. In particular, we highlight the comparative utility of the NPM‒NPG
distinction in analysing the different approaches to ﬁnancing and commissioning public
services evident in our two case studies. However, our analysis also leads us to suggest a
number of ways in which the depiction of the NPM-NPG archetypes (Osborne 2006,
2010) could be reﬁned to give greater conceptual clarity. Speciﬁcally, we propose that the
distinction in emphasis between NPM and NPG should not focus on whether one is
concerned with processes and outputs and the other with outcomes. Rather, a more useful
distinction lies in the purpose for which outcome data is gathered (Bevan 2010). Under
NPM, the principal purpose is managing performance with outcome data used for
extrinsic motivation – rewarding actors based on their progress toward outcome targets.
By contrast, we argue that NPG approaches use outcome data for reﬂection on progress
towards shared goals as part of a more relational model of accountability. Applied to this
case, this distinction leads to a hypothesis which explains why SIBs appear to be a less
appropriate ﬁnancing mechanism for social prescribing than conventional commission-
ing: it is not because one or the other has a greater outcome focus, it is that one uses
outcome data for performance management, the other for learning,
Finally, it is necessary to reﬂect on the limitations of our study. We do not address the
issue of outcomes or the comparative effectiveness of the respective interventions in this
paper as the requisite quantitative data is not yet available. Furthermore, this is a
qualitative comparison of just two case studies of a speciﬁc service intervention which
limits our ability to generalise beyond Beardstown and Mooretown (and, by extension,
England), and the social prescribing intervention, to conclusively assert that the differ-
ences identiﬁed were due to the ﬁnancing mechanism rather than wider contextual
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factors. However, given that our ﬁndings ﬁt with the broader international evidence about
SIB management practices (Fraser et al. 2018a), and are nested with a broader debate
about governance archetypes, we feel that these limitations do not diminish our con-
tribution to the emergent evidence around social prescribing, SIBs, and the wider study
of public policy, management and governance.
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